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 Coal has always cursed the land in which it lies. When men begin 
to wrest it from the earth it leaves a legacy of foul streams, hideous 
slag heaps and polluted air.  It peoples this transformed land with 
blind and crippled men and with widows and orphans. It is an 
extractive industry, which takes all and restores nothing. It mars but 
never beautifies. It corrupts but never purifies. 
  - Harry Caudill1 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 13, 2011, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) made history.2 The EPA issued its thirteenth veto in nearly 
half a century to shut down portions of the largest mountaintop removal 
mining project ever authorized in West Virginia, the Spruce No. 1 
Mine.3 This thirteenth veto was different from its twelve predecessors: 
it came two and a half years after the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(“Corps”) issued the Mingo Logan Coal Company a section 404 permit 
to discharge fill from the Spruce No. 1 Mine.4 Mingo Logan 
immediately brought suit against the EPA, arguing that section 404(c) 
of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), which gives the EPA its veto power, 
cannot be invoked after the Corps issues a permit.5 The district court 
 
1 HARRY M. CAUDILL, NIGHT COMES TO THE CUMBERLANDS, A BIOGRAPHY OF A 
DEPRESSED AREA x (1st ed. 1963). 
2 Stopping a Massive Mountaintop Removal Coal Mine, EARTHJUSTICE, 
http://earthjustice.org/cases/2014/stopping-a-massive-mountaintop-removal-coal-mine 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2015). 
3 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL DETERMINATION OF THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY PURSUANT TO § 404(C) OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT CONCERNING 
THE SPRUCE NO. 1 MINE, LOGAN COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA, 10 (2011), http://water.epa 
.gov/lawsregs/guidance/cwa/dredgdis/upload/Spruce_No-_1_Mine_Final_Determination 
_011311_signed.pdf [hereinafter FINAL DETERMINATION]. 
4 Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA (Mingo Logan I), 850 F. Supp. 2d 133, 137 (D.D.C. 
2012). Section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) authorizes the Corps to “issue 
permits . . . for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified 
disposal sites.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012). 
5 Mingo Logan I, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 137. Section 404(c) of the CWA authorizes the EPA 
to issue a veto of a specified disposal site “whenever [it] determines . . . that the discharge 
BAHADUE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/13/2016  11:04 AM 
2015] Justice Ginsburg Is Right: The EPA’s Veto Authority 3 
Under the Clean Water Act Is “Hardly Reassuring” 
Against Evasive Polluters 
agreed and vacated the EPA’s veto.6 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit 
reversed and held that the EPA can veto a permit at any time because 
the EPA is the final authority on the discharge of mining waste.7 On 
remand, the veto was upheld as reasonable and supported by the 
record.8 
When the EPA initially issued its veto, West Virginia Senator Joe 
Manchin declared the decision “fundamentally wrong,” “an 
unprecedented act,” and “an irresponsible regulatory step.”9 The 
Senator’s reaction is not surprising. The coal industry provides forty 
percent of electricity in the United States and plays an important part 
in West Virginia’s economy.10 Since the mid-1880s, the coal industry 
in Appalachia has produced over 12 billion tons of coal.11 As demand 
for Appalachia’s low sulfur coal increased, mining companies 
developed cheaper methods of extracting coal.12 
One such method is called mountaintop removal mining, which 
involves removing the top of a mountain to expose and recover the coal 
within.13  To expose a coal seam, “[mountains] are filled with as much 
as ten times the explosives used in the Oklahoma City bombing [and] 
then detonated in series.”14 This process produces excess dirt and rock 
(“spoil”) that cannot be returned to the mined area.15 Typically, mining 
 
of [dredged and/or fill] material[] into such area will have an unacceptable adverse effect on 
municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas . . . wildlife, or recreational areas.” 
33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2012). 
6 Mingo Logan I, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 153. 
7 Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA (Mingo Logan II), 714 F.3d 608, 613 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
8 Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA (Mingo Logan III), 70 F. Supp. 3d 151, 170 (D.D.C 
2014). 
9 John M. Broder, Agency Revokes Permit for Major Coal Mining Project, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/14/science/earth/14coal.html. 
10 Robert Johnson, Wait Until You See What Our Coal Addiction Is Doing to West 
Virginia, BUSINESS INSIDER, (Feb. 14, 2014, 10:04 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com 
/west-virginia-coal-mining-2014-2. 
11 Paul A. Duffy, How Filled Was My Valley: Continuing the Debate on Disposal 
Impacts, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T. 143, 143 (2003). 
12 Id. at 144. 
13 CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21421, MOUNTAINTOP MINING: 
BACKGROUND ON CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 1 (2015); see also Johnson, supra note 10 
(providing images of the process and effects of mountaintop removal mining in West 
Virginia). 
14 Sam Evans, Voices From The Desecrated Places: A Journey to End Mountaintop 
Removal Mining, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 521, 524 (2010). 
15 COPELAND, supra note 13, at 1. 
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companies place the spoil in adjacent valleys, burying streams and 
creating valley fills.16 
Mountaintop removal mining significantly harms the environment.17 
In West Virginia, for example, mining companies extract coal from the 
oldest mountains in the world, which are “home to 255 species of birds, 
78 types of mammals, 58 different reptiles, and 76 various 
amphibians.”18 The overall effects of mountaintop removal mining 
include: large scale deforestation, permanent losses of streams, 
reduction of species in mined areas, and increases in minerals that 
cause deformities in aquatic life found downstream of mined areas.19 
Studies additionally show higher incidences of chronic illnesses, birth 
defects, and mortality among individuals living in coal-mining areas 
compared to individuals living in non-coal-mining areas.20 
To operate a mountaintop removal mine, a company must comply 
with the CWA.21 Known as the “cornerstone” of the CWA, section 301 
 
16 Id. 
17 In 2005, several agencies, including the EPA and the Corps, conducted a study on 
mountaintop mining in Appalachia and concluded the following: approximately seven 
percent of forest area “has been or may be affected by recent and future (1992–2012) 
mountaintop mining”; species such as songbirds and salamanders have left mined areas; 
“1200 miles of headwater streams (or 2% of the streams in the study area) were directly 
impacted by [mountaintop removal mining]”; and streams in mined areas show an increase 
of minerals and more pollutant-tolerant macroinvertebrates and fish. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, MOUNTAINTOP MINING/VALLEY FILLS IN APPALACHIA: FINAL PROGRAMMATIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 4 (2005). 
18 Johnson, supra note 10. 
19 See Diana Kaneva, Let’s Face Facts, These Mountains Won’t Grow Back: Reducing 
the Environmental Impact of Mountaintop Removal Coal Mining in Appalachia, 35 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 931, 933 (2011) (noting that mountaintop mining has 
destroyed 300 square miles of forest as of 2007); see also M.A. Palmer et al., Mountaintop 
Mining Consequences, 327 SCI. 148, 148 (2010) (explaining that streams below valley fills 
show increases in pH, electrical conductivity, and total dissolved solids, which corresponds 
to deformities in fish and reproductive failure in fish and birds). 
20 See, e.g., Michael Hendryx & Melissa M. Ahern, Mortality in Appalachian Coal 
Mining Regions: The Value of Statistical Life Lost, 124 PUB. HEALTH. REP. 541, 542, 547 
(2009) (showing mortality rates increases); Chronic Illness Linked to Coal-Mining 
Pollution, Study Shows, SCIENCEDAILY, Mar. 27, 2008, http://www.sciencedaily.com 
/releases/2008/03/080326201751.htm (“[A]s coal production increases, so does the 
incidence of chronic illness.”); Melissa M. Ahern, et al., The Association Between 
Mountaintop Mining and Birth Defects Among Live Births in Central Appalachia, 1996–
2003, 111 ENVTL. RESEARCH 838, 838–46 (2011) (noting increased birth defects). 
21 See Chantz Martin, Comment, The Clean Water Act Suffers a Crushing Blow: The U.S. 
Supreme Court Clears the Way for the Mining Industry to Pollute U.S. Waters [Coeur 
Alaska, Inc. v. Southwest Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458 (2009)], 49 
WASHBURN L.J. 933, 940–41 (2010). Typically, mining operations require a section 402 
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deems it unlawful to discharge a pollutant except when that discharge 
complies with CWA sections 301, 306, 402, and 404, among others.22 
Sections 301 and 306 instruct the EPA to establish effluent limitations 
and standards of performance, respectively, for certain categories of 
discharges.23 Under section 402, the EPA may “issue a permit for the 
discharge of any pollutant” that complies with any applicable effluent 
limitation or standard of performance.24 Under section 404, the Corps 
may “issue permits . . . for the discharge of dredged or fill material into 
navigable waters at specified disposal sites.”25 
In 2009, it was an open question as to whether EPA pollution-control 
standards promulgated pursuant to sections 301 and 306 applied to 
section 404 discharges of dredged or fill material. The Supreme Court 
answered this question in the negative in Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. 
Southeast Alaska Conservation Council.26 In this case, Coeur Alaska, 
Inc. operated a froth-flotation mine that discharged slurry into a lake 
and claimed that it did not have to comply with an EPA standard of 
performance because slurry qualified as fill material under section 
404.27 The discharge was lawful, the argument went, because fill 
material was not subject to EPA standards of performance.28 The Court 
agreed.29 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg voiced concerns, 
stating industries might attempt to “gain immunity” from pollution-
control standards by turning their pollutants into fill.30 In response, 
Justice Breyer contended that the EPA’s veto authority would 
safeguard against such a result.31 Justice Ginsburg found this solution 
“hardly reassuring.”32 
 
permit to discharge pollutants from a point source within the mine and a section 404 permit 
to discharge fill material. See Kaneva, supra note 19, at 944. 
22 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012); see also Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs (SEACC II), 486 F.3d 638, 644–45 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Coeur 
Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261 (2009) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
23 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1316 (2012). 
24 Id. § 1342(a). 
25 Id. § 1344(a). 
26 Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 286 (2009). 
27 Id. at 268. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 286. 
30 Id. at 302 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
31 Id. at 293 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
32 Id. at 303 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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The purpose of this paper is to examine this debate between Justice 
Breyer and Justice Ginsburg—whether the EPA’s veto authority is an 
effective safeguard against evasive polluters—in light of the D.C. 
Circuit’s expansive interpretation of the EPA’s veto authority in Mingo 
Logan v. EPA (“Mingo Logan II”). 
The paper is divided into four parts. Part one describes the permitting 
process, which explains sections 301, 306, 402, and 404 of the CWA 
and the definition of fill material adopted in 2002. Part two reviews 
Coeur Alaska, including the parties’ arguments before the Court, the 
majority opinion, Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion, and Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion. Part three discusses the facts and 
outcome of Mingo Logan II. Part four analyzes the significance and 
limitations of Mingo Logan II on the Justice Breyer and Justice 
Ginsburg debate, concluding that competing considerations reduce the 
effectiveness of the EPA’s veto. This finding confirms Justice 
Ginsburg’s assertion that the EPA’s veto authority is “hardly 
reassuring” to thwart polluters evading pollution-control standards. 
I 
THE PERMITTING PROCESS OF THE CWA 
In 1972, Congress enacted the CWA to “restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”33 
One particular aim of the CWA is to eliminate “the discharge of 
pollutants into the navigable waters” of the United States.34 With these 
goals in mind, the CWA provides two permitting regimes, discussed 
infra, that companies must comply with in order to operate 
mountaintop removal mines. 
A. Sections 301, 306, 402, and 404 of the CWA 
The “cornerstone” of the CWA is section 301, which declares it 
“unlawful” to discharge a pollutant except when that discharge 
complies with CWA sections 301, 306, 402, and 404, among others.35 
Section 301 instructs the EPA to adopt stringent effluent limitations for 
the discharge of pollutants from point sources, and once this limitation 
is promulgated, section 301(e) requires its application to all 
 
33 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012). 
34 Id. § 1251(a)(1). 
35 Id. § 1311(a); see also SEACC II, 486 F.3d at 644–45 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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discharges.36 This scheme also exists in section 306 in which the EPA 
promulgates standards of performance that apply to all discharges.37 
These effluent limitations and standards of performance are 
implemented through section 402 of the CWA, the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit program, which 
authorizes the EPA to “issue a permit for the discharge of any 
pollutant[] or combination of pollutants.”38 The NPDES program is the 
“linchpin” of the CWA for it transforms applicable pollution-control 
standards into obligations for each discharger who holds a section 402 
permit.39 Mountaintop removal mining projects require section 402 
permits for discharges of pollutants “from a point source within the 
min[e].”40 A mountaintop removal mining project, however, could not 
obtain a section 402 permit for the discharge of spoil into valley fills 
because “valley fills would have a hard time meeting th[e] standard[s]” 
set forth in sections 301 and 306.41 For these discharges, the CWA sets 
forth an additional permitting program under section 404, which 
“operates as an exception to section 402.”42 
A section 404 permit allows for the discharge of dredged or fill 
material.43 Specifically, section 404(a) authorizes the Corps to “issue 
permits . . . for the discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable 
 
36 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b), (e) (2012). Effluent limitations are restrictions on “quantities, 
rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological and other constituents which are 
discharged from point sources into navigable waters.” Id. § 1362(11) (2012). 
37 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b), (e) (2012). Standard of performance “means a standard for the 
control of the discharge of pollutants which reflects the greatest degree of effluent reduction 
which the Administrator determines to be achievable through application of the best 
available demonstrated control technology, processes, operating methods, or other 
alternatives, including, where practicable, a standard permitting no discharge of pollutants.” 
Id. § 1316(a)(1). 
38 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2012). The CWA defines “the discharge of any pollutant” as “any 
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source” and “pollutant” as 
“dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, 
chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded 
equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste 
discharged into water.” Id. § 1362(12), (6). 
39 Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 300 (2009) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
40 Kaneva, supra note 19, at 944. 
41 Evans, supra note 14, at 539. 
42 Id. 
43 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012). 
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waters at specified disposal sites.”44 Section 404(b)(1) requires the 
Corps to apply guidelines developed by the EPA to determine whether 
to issue a section 404 permit.45 These guidelines require the Corps to 
determine the effects of the proposed discharge on the “physical, 
chemical, and biological components of the aquatic environment.”46 
Section 404(c) subjects the Corps’ permitting authority to EPA 
oversight.47 Specifically, section 404(c) states: 
The Administrator is authorized to prohibit the specification 
(including the withdrawal of specification) of any defined area as a 
disposal site, and he is authorized to deny or restrict the use of any 
defined area for specification (including the withdrawal of 
specification) as a disposal site, whenever he determines, after notice 
and opportunity for public hearings, that the discharge of such 
materials into such area will have an unacceptable adverse effect on 
municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including 
spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas. Before 
making such determination, the Administrator shall consult with the 
Secretary. The Administrator shall set forth in writing and make 
public his findings and his reasons for making any determination 
under this subsection.48 
In other words, the EPA can veto a specified disposal site whenever 
it determines that the discharge of fill material will have unacceptable 
adverse effects. 
The EPA takes several steps to issue its veto.49 First, the Regional 
Administrator notifies the District Engineer that it intends to issue a 
proposed determination to prohibit or withdraw a specified site.50 If the 
District Engineer does not show that corrective action will be taken, the 
Regional Administrator publishes the proposed determination.51 
Individuals may comment on the proposed determination, and the 
Regional Administrator may hold a public hearing.52 After the 
comment period, the Regional Administrator prepares a recommended 
 
44 Id. 
45 Id. § 1344(b)(1). 
46 40 C.F.R. § 230.11 (2015). 
47 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2012). 
48 Id. 
49 See generally Amy Oxley, No Longer Mine: An Extensive Look at the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s Veto of the Section 404 Permit Held by the Spruce No. 1 Mine, 36 S. 
ILL. U. L.J. 139 (2011). 
50 40 C.F.R. § 231.3(a)(1) (2015). 
51 Id. § 231.3(a)(2). 
52 Id. § 231.4(a)–(b). 
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determination to prohibit or withdraw a specified site.53 The 
Administrator then reviews the recommended determination and 
consults the Chief Engineer and permittee concerning corrective 
action.54 Finally, the Administrator makes “a final determination 
affirming, modifying, or rescinding the recommended 
determination.”55 
B. The Definition of Fill Material 
Whether a discharge falls under the section 402 or section 404 
permitting regime depends on whether that discharge meets the fill 
definition adopted in 2002. The CWA does not define “fill material,” 
and, for much of section 404’s history, the Corps and the EPA defined 
fill material differently.56 In 1977, the Corps adopted a primary purpose 
test which defined fill material as: 
[A]ny material used for the primary purpose of replacing an aquatic 
area with dry land or of changing the bottom elevation of an 
waterbody. The term does not include any pollutant discharged into 
the water primarily to dispose of waste, as that activity is regulated 
under section 402 of the Clean Water Act.57 
This definition remained until 2002.58 The EPA, on the other hand, 
adopted an effects-based test in 1980, defining fill material as “any 
‘pollutant’ which replaces portions of the ‘waters of the United States’ 
with dry land or which changes the bottom elevation of a water body 
for any purpose.”59 
In 2002, the Corps and the EPA adopted the EPA’s effects-based 
test, defining fill material as follows: 
[T]he term fill material means material placed in waters of the United 
States where the material has the effect of: (i) [r]eplacing any portion 
of a water of the United States with dry land; or (ii) [c]hanging the 
bottom elevation of any portion of a water of the United States . . . 
[e]xamples of such fill material include, but are not limited to: rock, 
 
53 Id. § 231.5(a). 
54 Id. § 231.6. 
55 Id. 
56 See generally Nathaniel Browand, Shifting the Boundary Between the Sections 402 
and 404 Permitting Programs by Expanding the Definition of Fill Material, 31 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 617 (2004). 
57 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (2001). 
58 Browand, supra note 56, at 625. 
59 Id. at 626. 
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sand, soil, clay plastics, construction debris, wood chips, overburden 
from mining or excavation activities, and materials used to create any 
structure or infrastructure in the waters of the United States.60 
Significantly, the lawfulness of the 2002 fill definition is an open 
question.61 In Kentuckians for Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, a 
mining company sought a section 404 permit to build fills and sediment 
ponds where it intended to dump excess mining spoil.62 The EPA and 
the Corps changed the definition of fill material “a few days before” 
the district court rendered its opinion.63 Notwithstanding the rule 
change, the district court granted an injunction to prevent the Corps 
from issuing the permit, holding that the “issuance of . . . permits solely 
for waste disposal” is unlawful and that the 2002 fill definition 
“exceed[ed] the agencies’ statutory authority granted by the CWA.”64 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated and reversed the district court, 
holding the fill definition was not limited to beneficial use and that the 
district court “reached beyond the issues” when it declared the 2002 fill 
definition illegal.65 
Additionally, in Coeur Alaska, the parties did not challenge the 
validity of the fill definition.66 At oral argument, the Justices 
demonstrated an interest in the issue. For example, in questioning the 
Solicitor General, Justice Souter stated, “I find it very difficult to get a 
handle on this case without dealing with [the validity of the fill 
definition].”67 Additionally, Justice Ginsburg asked both the Solicitor 
General and Petitioners about the primary purpose test that existed 
prior to 2002. To the Solicitor General, she asked: “How could the [fill 
definition] be settled, because isn’t it a fact that before 2002 if the 
 
60 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (e)(1) (2002). Commenters contend that the Bush Administration’s 
political agenda motivated this change. See, e.g., Kaneva, supra note 19, at 951; Evans, 
supra note 14, at 541–54; Matt Wasson, Obama Administration Can Still Protect Streams 
from Mountaintop Removal Mining, Despite Setback in DC Court, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 
8, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/matt-wasson/mountaintop-removal-mining_b_17 
38551.html. Others explain that a circuit court split motivated the agencies. See, e.g., Martin, 
supra note 21, at 942 n.91; Browand, supra note 56, at 632. 
61 See Evans, supra note 14, at 548. 
62 Kentuckians for Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh (Rivenburgh II), 317 F.3d 425, 
430–31 (4th Cir. 2003). 
63 Id. at 438. 
64 Kentuckians for Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh (Rivenburgh I), 204 F. Supp. 2d 
927, 945–46 (S.D. W. Va. 2002), rev’d 317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003). 
65 Rivenburgh II, 317 F.3d at 439, 442. 
66 Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 276 (2009). 
67 Oral Argument at 7, Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 
261 (2009) (Nos. 07-984, 07-990), 2009 WL 62119 at *7. 
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primary purpose was disposing of waste that the 402 permit applied?”68 
To Petitioner, she commented: “[U]ntil 2002 . . . if the only reason of 
raising the elevation of the lake was to dispose of waste, you didn’t get 
a 404 permit.”69 Ultimately, this issue was not before the Court, and the 
majority opinion indicated that Respondent, in a subsequent action, 
“could claim that the fill regulation as interpreted is an unreasonable 
interpretation of § 404.”70 
II 
THE PERMITTING PROCESS IN THE SUPREME COURT: COEUR 
ALASKA 
Coeur Alaska is not a case about coal mining; rather, it involves a 
gold mining company seeking a section 404 permit for a discharge that 
is simultaneously subject to a standard of performance under section 
306. Significantly, Coeur Alaska raises concerns about whether the 
EPA’s veto is a sufficient safeguard against polluters seeking a section 
404 permit to circumvent pollution-control standards imposed on 
section 402 permitees. 
A. Factual Background 
Forty-five miles south of Juneau, Coeur Alaska, Inc. planned to 
reinvigorate the Kensington Gold Mine by constructing a froth-
flotation mill facility.71 This process involves transporting ore-bearing 
rock from the mine to a mill and, once at the mill, churning, crushing, 
and grinding the rock.72 The finely-ground rock is then fed into a tank 
in which chemicals and air attach to gold deposits, lifting them to the 
surface.73 After the gold deposits are skimmed off the top of these 
tanks, the tailings—residual rock—remain as waste.74 Coeur Alaska 
initially proposed to dispose of the tailings via a “dry tailings facility” 
in which the mine would deposit the tailings on nearby wetlands.75 
 
68 Id. at 7–8. 
69 Id. at 20. 
70 Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 276. 
71 Brief for Petitioner Coeur Alaska, Inc. at 5, Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. 261 (Nos. 07-984, 
07-990), 2008 WL 4278528 at *5. 
72 SEACC II, 486 F.3d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 2007). 
73 Id. 
74 Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 267. 
75 SEACC II, 486 F.3d at 641. 
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When the price of gold dropped, Coeur Alaska sought a different 
disposal option: discharging the tailings directly into nearby Lower 
Slate Lake.76 The plan involved piping 210,000 gallons of wastewater, 
including 1,440 tons of tailings, each day in the form of slurry, which 
resulted in raising the elevation of the lake to fifty feet and killing the 
entire population of the lake’s fish and nearly all aquatic life.77 Once 
operations ended, Coeur Alaska would reclaim the lake and restore the 
fish population.78 
Early on, the EPA recognized the adverse effects of discharging 
waste from mines using this froth-flotation technique.79 Pursuant to 
sections 301 and 306, in 1982, the EPA issued effluent limitations and 
standards of performance for sources within the ore-mining category, 
including gold mining.80 Specifically, for gold mines using froth-
flotation, the EPA issued a zero-discharge standard.81 In other words, 
the EPA categorically precluded gold mines using froth-flotation from 
discharging processed wastewater into navigable waters of the United 
States.82 
Concluding that the slurry raised the elevation of the lake and thus 
fell within section 404 of the CWA, the Corps disregarded the EPA 
performance standard and issued Coeur Alaska a section 404 permit to 
discharge slurry into Lower Slate Lake.83 
B. Procedural Background 
The Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, the Sierra Club, and 
Lynn Canal Conservation (collectively “SEACC”) brought suit against 
 
76 Brief for Petitioner Coeur Alaska, Inc., supra note 71, at *6. 
77 Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 296–97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
78 Brief for Petitioner Coeur Alaska, Inc., supra note 71, at *6. Respondents argued that 
“[t]he discharge would kill all fish in Lower Slate Lake . . . [and] [w]hether aquatic life 
would be able to repopulate . . . is uncertain.” Brief for Respondents Se. Alaska Conservation 
Council, Sierra Club, and Lynn Canal Conservation, Coeur Alaska, (Nos. 07-984, 07-990), 
2008 WL 4892761 at *4 [hereinafter Brief for Respondent SEACC]. 
79 Brief for Respondent SEACC at 8, Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. 261 (Nos. 07-984, 07-990), 
at *8. 
80 Ore Mining and Dressing Point Source Category Effluent Limitations Guidelines and 
New Source Performance Standards, 47 Fed. Reg. 54,598 (U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency 1982) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 440). 
81 40 C.F.R. § 440.104(b)(1) (1988). 
82 Id. 
83 Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 268. 
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the Corps in the District Court of Alaska.84 Coeur Alaska, Inc. and the 
State of Alaska intervened.85 SEACC argued that, because the section 
404 permit did not comply with the EPA’s restriction on froth-flotation 
mines it violated sections 306(e) and 311(e) of the CWA. Or, in the 
alternative, the regulation defining fill material was contrary to the 
CWA.86 Coeur Alaska and the State of Alaska claimed that the 
discharge of slurry from the mine was not subject to pollution-control 
standards because it met the fill definition and thus fell under the 
section 404 permitting regime, not section 402.87 
The district court agreed with Coeur Alaska and the State. The court 
addressed SEACC’s first argument in a footnote, explaining that 
sections 301 and 306 were inapplicable if slurry fell within the 2002 
fill definition.88 The court then focused on SEACC’s second argument 
and held that the fill definition was not contrary to the CWA because 
Congress “clearly and unequivocally” gave the agencies authority to 
issue regulations necessary to execute the CWA and thus are entitled 
to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.89 The district court also explained that plaintiffs 
incorrectly overlooked statements in the adoption statement of the fill 
definition, which stated that “slurry” and “tailings” fell within the 
definition of fill material.90 Accordingly, the district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Coeur Alaska and the State of Alaska.91 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court on two grounds.92 First, 
the Ninth Circuit held that the plain language of the CWA requires that 
 
84 Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SEACC I), No. 1:05-
CV-00012-JKS, 2006 WL 5483382 (D. Alaska Aug. 3, 2006), rev’d, 479 F.3d 1148 (9th 
Cir. 2007). 
85 Id. at *1. 
86 Id. at *2–3. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at *3 n.35. 
89 Id. at *4. When interpreting a statute entrusted to an agency, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. requires courts to conduct a two-step analysis: 
first, a court examines “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue,” and if so, the court “give[s] effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress;” if the “statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” courts 
then defer to the agency as long as its interpretation is “based on a permissible construction 
of the statute.” 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
90 SEACC I, 2006 WL 5483382, at *5. 
91 Id. 
92 SEACC II, 486 F.3d at 644. 
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the EPA pollution-control standards trump section 404.93 After finding 
that the regulations were “at odds” with each other, the Ninth Circuit 
analyzed the language of sections 301 and 306. Section 301(e) “applies 
effluent limitations established by the EPA to all discharges,” and 
section 306(e) “prohibits any discharge that does not comply with 
performance standards promulgated by the EPA.”94 Here, the Ninth 
Circuit found that sections 301 and 306 are blanket prohibitions and 
that no language in the CWA indicates an exception for section 404.95 
Second, the Ninth Circuit held that neither the Corps nor the EPA 
intended for the “regulatory definition of ‘fill material’ to replace the 
performance standard for froth-flotation mills.”96 The court relied on 
the following three conclusions to support this finding: (1) the EPA 
issued its performance standard precluding froth-flotation without 
making an exception for section 404 discharges; (2) in adopting the fill 
definition, the agencies did not intend to change their long-standing 
practice in which the EPA regulates discharges subject to effluent 
limitations; and (3) the Corps communicated to Coeur Alaska during 
the permitting process that section 404 does not regulate froth-flotation 
discharges.97 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit found that the Corps 
violated the CWA by issuing a permit to Coeur Alaska for discharges 
prohibited under an EPA performance standard pursuant to sections 
301 and 306 of the CWA.98 
C. The Supreme Court’s Decision 
Petitioners’ and Respondents’ arguments before the Court both 
employed a Chevron framework, but Petitioners focused on section 404 
and Respondents focused on section 306.99 Specifically, Petitioner 
Coeur Alaska, Petitioner State of Alaska, and Federal Respondents 
argued the following: (1) the plain language of section 404 gives the 
Corps a clear mandate to issue permits for material that falls within the 
fill definition; (2) the plain language does not place any qualification 
on this authority; and (3) the section 404(b)(1) guidelines do not require 
 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 642. 
95 Id. at 648. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 649–53. 
98 Id. at 655. 
99 Id. at 640–43. 
BAHADUE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/13/2016  11:04 AM 
2015] Justice Ginsburg Is Right: The EPA’s Veto Authority 15 
Under the Clean Water Act Is “Hardly Reassuring” 
Against Evasive Polluters 
section 404 permits to comply with EPA’s effluent limitations.100 As 
Solicitor General Garre stated in oral argument, “fill material trumps 
effluent.”101 Alternatively, Petitioners and Federal Respondents 
contended that if the Court found section 404 ambiguous, the agencies’ 
past practice indicated that fill material had never been subject to 
effluent limitations.102 
Respondent SEACC focused on section 306, contending that its 
plain language categorically bars discharges not in compliance with a 
standard of performance.103 From this, Respondent SEACC argued that 
a discharge subject to a standard of performance, such as the slurry 
from the Kensington Mine, must fall within section 402 because section 
404 does not provide for compliance with section 306.104 Alternatively, 
Respondent SEACC argued that if the Court found section 306 
ambiguous, the agencies’ intent—which aimed to keep discharges 
subject to effluent limitations within the EPA’s control—should 
govern.105 
The Court agreed with Petitioners. Justice Kennedy authored the 
majority opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, 
 
100 Brief for Petitioner Coeur Alaska, Inc., supra note 71, at *11–12 (“Section 404, 
however, gives the Corps a clear mandate and unambiguous instructions with respect to the 
issuance of permits for the discharge of fill material, and there is no dispute here that the 
Corps followed the commands of Section 404 to the letter.”); Brief for Petitioner State of 
Alaska at 20, Coeur Alaska, (Nos. 07-984, 07-990), 2008 WL 4278529 at *20 (“The plain 
language of Section 404 authorized the Corps to grant the permit at issue.”); Brief for the 
Federal Respondents Supporting Petitioners at 14, Coeur Alaska, (Nos. 07-984, 07-990), 
2008 WL 4278530 at *14 (“The Act and the Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines require that 
discharges of fill material comply with toxic effluent limitations promulgated under Section 
307, but they do not require compliance with other effluent limitations.”). 
101 Oral Argument, supra note 67, at 5. 
102 Brief for Petitioners Coeur Alaska, Inc., supra note 71, at *14 (“[T]he regulatory 
history further demonstrates that the Fill Rule applies to ‘any mining-related material that 
has the effect of fill when discharged.’”); Brief for Petitioners State of Alaska at 23, Coeur 
Alaska, (Nos. 07-984, 07-990), 2008 WL 4278529 at *23 (“[F]ormal agency regulations 
have consistently provided that: (1) discharges of fill material do not require EPA permits; 
(2) all such discharges are subject instead to the Corps’ authority under Section 404; and (3) 
such permits may be granted without strict adherence to EPA-promulgated effluent 
limitations.”); Brief for the Federal Respondents Supporting Petitioners at 17, Coeur Alaska, 
(Nos. 07-984, 07-990), 2008 WL 4278530 at *17 (“The Ninth Circuit’s selective reliance 
on statements from the preamble to the fill rule and on other regulatory history cannot trump 
the . . . agencies’ controlling construction of that text.”). 
103 Brief for Respondent SEACC, supra note 78, at *20–21. 
104 Id. at *21. 
105 Id. at *23. 
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Breyer, and Alito joined, as well as Justice Scalia in part.106 Justice 
Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in part and in judgment,107 Justice 
Breyer wrote a concurring opinion,108 and Justice Ginsburg wrote a 
dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens and Souter joined.109 
1. The Opinion of the Court 
The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit on two grounds.110 First, the 
Court found that the Corps had authority to issue a section 404 permit 
for the slurry discharge.111 Relying on the plain language of section 404 
and EPA regulations, the Court concluded that section 404 does “not 
limit [the Corps’] power,” and EPA regulations do not preclude 
discharges subject to an EPA standard of performance.112 
Second, the Court analyzed the statutory text, the agencies’ 
regulations, and the EPA’s interpretation of those regulations to 
conclude that section 306 does not apply to section 404 discharges.113 
The Court found that the statutory text and formal agency regulations 
were ambiguous and did not resolve the tension between the 
sections.114 Accordingly, the Court employed Chevron Step Two and 
deferred to a 2004 Memorandum written by the Director of the EPA’s 
Wetlands, Oceans, and Watersheds to the Director of the EPA’s Office 
of Water.115 The 2004 Memorandum interpreted a formal EPA 
regulation, clarifying that effluent limitations did not apply to the 
tailings in Lower Slate Lake for the Kensington Mine.116 From here, 
the Court provided factors as for why the Memorandum should receive 
deference, including that the Kensington Mine was not a “project that 
smuggle[d] a discharge of EPA-regulated pollutants into a separate 
discharge of Corps-regulated fill material.”117 Concerns for such 
 
106 Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 265–91. 
107 Id. at 295–96 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in judgment). 
108 Id. at 291–94 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
109 Id. at 296–304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
110 Id. at 290–91. 
111 Id. at 277, 286. 
112 Id. at 276. 
113 Id. at 277. 
114 Id. at 281–82 (“On the one hand, [section] 306 provides that a discharge that violates 
an EPA new source performance standard is ‘unlawful’ . . . [and] [o]n the other hand, 
[section] 404 grants the Corps blanket authority to permit the discharge of fill material              
. . . .”). 
115 Id. at 282. 
116 Id. at 284. 
117 Id. at 285. 
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projects arose in both Justice Breyer’s concurrence and Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent, highlighting a potential loophole in the permitting 
process and demonstrating a need for adequate safeguards. 
2. Justice Breyer’s Concurrence and Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent 
Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg separately discussed the 
potential for polluters to evade pollution control standards. Justice 
Breyer found that subjecting section 404 permits to performance 
standards would be “unnecessarily strict,” and CWA “safeguards” 
prevent polluters from “turning a ‘pollutant’ governed by [section] 306 
into ‘fill’ governed by [section] 404.”118 Namely, the EPA’s veto is one 
such safeguard.119 
Justice Ginsburg disagreed, contending that the majority’s 
interpretation of the CWA’s permitting scheme provides an “escape 
hatch” to “[w]hole categories of regulated industries” that may “gain 
immunity” so long as the pollutant “contains sufficient solid matter to 
raise the bottom of a water body.”120 Justice Ginsburg stated that this 
“loophole” would swallow “standards governing mining activities,” 
citing several EPA performance standards for ore mining and dressing, 
coal mining, and mineral mining.121 In response to Justice Breyer’s 
solution, Justice Ginsburg noted that the EPA’s veto is rarely used and 
that the “unacceptable adverse effects” standard is ineffective.122 
Justice Ginsburg pointed to the case at bar as an example, and 
questioned why destroying an entire population of fish was not 
“unacceptable” enough to invoke the EPA’s veto.123 Accordingly, 
Justice Ginsburg characterized the veto as a “hardly reassuring” 
safeguard against evasive polluters.124 
III 
THE VETO IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT: MINGO LOGAN II 
In Mingo Logan II, the D.C. Circuit ratified the EPA’s retroactive 
use of its veto authority to shut down portions of the Spruce No. 1 Mine. 
 
118 Id. at 292–93 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
119 Id. at 293. 
120 Id. at 302–03 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 303 n.5. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
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This expansive interpretation of the EPA’s authority has the potential 
to transform the EPA veto into an effective safeguard against polluters 
seeking to take advantage of the permitting process. 
A. Factual Background 
Mingo Logan owned and operated the Spruce No. 1 Mine in West 
Virginia at the time the EPA issued its Final Determination.125 As 
originally proposed, the project required “construct[ing] six valley fills 
[and] associated sediment structures” to discharge “fill material into the 
Right Fork of Seng Camp Creek, Pigeonroost Branch, Oldhouse 
Branch and their tributaries.”126 As a result, this discharge would 
“disturb approximately 2,278 acres (about 3.5 square miles) and bury 
approximately 7.48 miles of streams beneath 110 million cubic yards 
of excess spoil.”127 The Spruce No. 1 Mine was one of the largest 
mountaintop removal mining projects ever authorized in West 
Virginia.128 
Mingo Logan applied for section 402 and section 404 permits to 
operate the Spruce No. 1 Mine. The EPA approved a section 402 permit 
authorizing Mingo Logan to discharge wastewater from sediment 
ponds into nearby streams.129 Mingo Logan sought a section 404 permit 
to discharge fill into the Right Fork of Seng Camp Creek, Pigeonroost 
Branch, Oldhouse Branch and their tributaries.130 Beginning in 1998, 
the Corps and the EPA reviewed Mingo Logan’s section 404 permit 
and communicated about the project’s effects on the surrounding 
habitat.131 In 2002, the Corps issued a draft Environmental Impact 
Statement (“EIS”) to which the EPA “found gaps in the analyses of the 
mine and related adverse environmental impacts.”132 In 2006, the Corps 
issued another draft EIS to which the EPA again expressed concerns 
about water quality, proposed mitigation efforts, environmental justice, 
and the cumulative effects of multiple mining operations.133 Months 
later, on September 22, 2006, the Corps issued its final EIS to which 
 
125 FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 3, at 6. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 15. 
129 Mingo Logan III, 70 F. Supp. 3d 151, 154 (D.D.C. 2014). 
130 FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 3, at 19. 
131 Id. at 18. 
132 Mingo Logan III, at 158. 
133 FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 3, at 18–19. 
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the EPA noted “its concerns had not been adequately addressed.”134 On 
January 22, 2007, the Corps issued Mingo Logan a section 404 permit 
despite the EPA’s lingering concerns.135 
Nearly three years later, on September 3, 2009, EPA Region III 
requested that the Corps use its authority under 33 C.F.R. § 325.7 to 
“suspend, revoke, or modify” Mingo Logan’s section 404 permit, citing 
new information and recent data that revealed inadequately addressed 
impacts.136 When the Corps denied this request, the regional 
administrator published a proposed determination to veto specification 
of the Pigeonroost and Oldhouse Branch streams as disposal sites for 
section 404 discharges, and subsequently solicited and received over 
50,000 comments.137 After this comment period, on September 24, 
2010, the regional administrator submitted its recommended 
determination to EPA headquarters.138 Though the EPA provided 
Mingo Logan, the Corps, and other project proponents an opportunity 
to propose corrective action, Mingo Logan ultimately did not do so.139 
On January 13, 2011, the EPA issued its Final Determination 
purporting to veto the “specification of [the] Pigeonroost Branch, 
Oldhouse Branch and their tributaries . . . as a disposal site for dredged 
or fill material in connection with construction of the Spruce No. 1 
Surface Mine.”140 The EPA based its Final Determination on two 
grounds: (1) the fill discharge would bury approximately 6.6 miles of 
high-quality headwater streams, causing unacceptable adverse effects 
to wildlife habitat; and (2) the fill discharge would transform these 
streams into sources of pollutants that will impact wildlife 
downstream.141 
B. Procedural Background 
After EPA Region III published its proposed determination, Mingo 
Logan filed a fourteen-count complaint in the U.S. District Court for 
 
134 Id. at 19. 
135 Mingo Logan III, at 159. 
136 FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 3, at 21. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 22. 
139 Id. at 24. 
140 Id. at 6. 
141 Id. 
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the District of Columbia.142 Once the EPA issued its Final 
Determination, Mingo Logan amended its complaint and challenged 
the EPA’s veto under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).143 
Parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district 
court entered an order requiring “argument [solely] on the question of 
whether the EPA had authority under section 404(c) of the Clean Water 
Act to withdraw its specification of the disposal site after the Corps had 
already issued a permit under section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act 
(Count I).”144 
After hearing argument, the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Mingo Logan and held that the “EPA exceeded its 
section 404(c) authority.”145 To reach this conclusion, the district court 
reviewed the EPA’s interpretation of section 404(c) under Chevron.146 
Under Chevron step one, the district court held that the statute’s plain 
language did not “clearly state that the EPA can withdraw its consent 
at any time, or whenever it sees fit, or even just ‘whenever.’”147 
Moreover, as explained by the district court, section 404 as a whole and 
its legislative history indicated that the EPA could only invoke its veto 
before the Corps issued a permit.148 After finding the statute 
ambiguous, the district court moved to Chevron step two and found that 
the EPA’s interpretation of section 404(c) was unreasonable because it 
“posit[ed] a scenario involving the automatic self-destruction of a 
written permit issued by an entirely separate federal agency after years 
of study and consideration.”149 The court concluded that interpreting 
section 404(c) to allow the EPA to veto a permit post-issuance would 
undermine CWA’s principles of finality and certainty.150 
C. The D.C. Circuit Opinion 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed and held that the EPA can 
invoke its veto authority at “any time.”151 Judge Henderson authored 
the opinion and, under Chevron step one, reasoned that the language of 
 
142 Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d 608, 611 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
143 Id. 
144 Mingo Logan I, 850 F. Supp. 2d 133, 137 (D.D.C. 2012) (emphasis added). 
145 Id. at 137–38. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 140. 
148 Id. at 144, 147. 
149 Id. at 152. 
150 Id. 
151 Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d 608, 613 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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section 404(c) unambiguously “imposes no temporal limits on the 
[EPA’s] authority to withdraw the Corp’s specification [and] instead 
expressly empower[s] [the EPA] to prohibit, restrict or withdraw the 
specification ‘whenever’ [the EPA] makes a determination that the 
statutory ‘unacceptable adverse effect’ will result.”152 The D.C. Circuit 
focused on the word, ‘whenever,’ reasoning that Congress purposefully 
used “the expansive conjunction” and that, under the dictionary 
definition, ‘whenever’ meant “[a]t whatever time, no matter when.”153 
The court further explained that the “unambiguous language [of the 
statute] manifest[ed] the Congress’s intent to confer on EPA a broad 
veto power extending beyond the permit issuance.”154 
The court additionally reviewed and rejected Mingo Logan’s 
arguments on statutory language and legislative history. The court did 
not agree that the language of section 404(c) required that the EPA 
withdraw a site specification before a permit is issued simply because 
specification itself occurs before a permit is issued.155 Additionally, the 
court rejected Mingo Logan’s contention that the EPA’s interpretation 
conflicted with section 404 “as a whole.”156 Here, the court emphasized 
the plain meaning of section 404(c) and stated not once, but twice, that 
the EPA has the final word on site specification.157 Lastly, the court 
found that the legislative history did not foreclose a veto post-
issuance.158 Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit remanded the action to the 
district court to address the merits of Mingo Logan’s APA challenge.159 
On remand, the remaining issue was whether the EPA’s Final 
Determination withdrawing the Pigeonroost Branch and Oldhouse 
Branch as disposal sites was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”160 Mingo 
Logan attacked the sufficiency of EPA’s conclusions in its Final 
Determination, but the district court concluded that the Final 
Determination “provided a reasonable explanation” for the veto to 
 
152 Id. at 613 (first emphasis added). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. (emphasis added). 
155 Id. at 614. 
156 Id. at 615 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
157 Id. at 614. 
158 Id. at 616. 
159 Id. 
160 Mingo Logan III, 70 F. Supp. 3d 151, 161 (D.D.C 2014). 
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which the court must defer.161 Accordingly, the district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the EPA.162 
IV 
THE SIGNIFICANCE AND LIMITATIONS OF MINGO LOGAN II FOR 
COEUR ALASKA 
In Mingo Logan II, the D.C. Circuit found that section 404(c) 
imposes no temporal restriction on the EPA and vests final authority in 
the EPA during the permitting process. This decision supports Justice 
Breyer’s contention found in Coeur Alaska that the EPA’s veto is an 
effective safeguard against evasive polluters. At the same time, 
competing considerations limit the D.C. Circuit’s broad interpretation 
of the EPA’s veto authority and, ultimately, outweigh the significance 
of Mingo Logan. 
A. The Significance of Mingo Logan II 
The literal import of Coeur Alaska is that performance standards do 
not apply to fill material, which may allow companies seeking to 
discharge pollutants to potentially sidestep EPA performance standards 
by turning such pollutants into fill material. As a result, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Coeur Alaska favors the mining industry, which is 
typically subject to EPA effluent limitations and standards of 
performance.163 Mining companies might “apply to the Corps to try and 
discharge chemicals that should be regulated by the EPA” or 
“strategically think[] of ways to qualify their discharge for the less 
stringent 404 permits from the Corps.”164 
Despite this concern, Mingo Logan II improves the landscape Coeur 
Alaska left behind for the following three reasons. First, the D.C. 
Circuit opinion validated the EPA’s role within the permitting process. 
Specifically, the court stated section 404 confers on the EPA a “broad 
veto power extending beyond the permit issuance.”165 Moreover, the 
court found that section 404 as a whole “makes equally clear . . . that 
 
161 Id. at 162. 
162 Id. 
163 Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 302 (2009) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (listing effluent limitations and performance standards for ore 
mining and dressing and mineral mining). 
164 Kory R. Watson, Comment, Fill Material Pollution Under the Clean Water Act: A 
Need for Legislative Change, 35 S. ILL. U. L.J. 335, 349 (2011). 
165 Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA (Mingo Logan II), 714 F.3d 608, 613 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
BAHADUE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/13/2016  11:04 AM 
2015] Justice Ginsburg Is Right: The EPA’s Veto Authority 23 
Under the Clean Water Act Is “Hardly Reassuring” 
Against Evasive Polluters 
[the EPA] has, in effect, the final say.”166 The court reiterated this 
conclusion, stating “the statute expressly vests final authority over [site 
specification in the EPA].”167 At bottom, polluters aiming to 
manipulate the permitting process must pass muster with the EPA. 
Second, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that section 404(c) imposes no 
temporal restriction on the EPA’s authority to veto a specified site.168 
The court based this conclusion on Chevron step one, focusing on the 
word ‘whenever’ in section 404(c).169 Specifically, Congress’s use of 
the “expansive conjunction ‘whenever’ . . . made plain its intent to grant 
the Administrator authority to [exercise its veto] at any time,”170 
confirming that the EPA is not subject to a prescribed timeline. Thus, 
Mingo Logan II opens the proverbial door for the EPA’s review of 
previously issued section 404 permits. 
Third, Mingo Logan II sends a powerful message to mining 
companies considering the case’s factual background.171 The Spruce 
No. 1 Mine was the largest mountaintop removal mine ever authorized 
in West Virginia.172 If operated as planned, the Spruce No. 1 Mine 
would have supported $220 billion worth of economic activity each 
year.173 Furthermore, the Final Determination itself “block[ed] an 
additional $250 million investment and 250 well-paying American 
jobs.”174 The D.C. Circuit’s ratification of the EPA’s veto in light of 
such promising economic returns informs polluters of the economic 
risks involved with manipulating the permitting process. 
By emphasizing the EPA’s final authority in the permitting process, 
confirming the EPA’s retroactive use of the veto, and cautioning 
polluters of economic risks, Mingo Logan II challenges Justice 
 
166 Id. at 614. 
167 Id. (emphasis added). 
168 Id. at 613. 
169 See id.; see also Jason Bailey, Clean Water Act, Section 404 Application: May the 
Odds be Ever in your Favor, 3 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 457, 466–68 (2014). 
170 Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d at 613. 
171 See Bailey, supra note 170, at 481 (noting the D.C. Circuit opinion leaves business 
and investors “no safety net if they find themselves in a Mingo Logan situation”). 
172 FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 3, at 10. 
173 Bryan Walsh, Mining: The EPA Vetoes a Mountaintop Removal Mine—and Industry 
Opponents Fire Back, TIME, Jan. 13, 2011, http://science.time.com/2011/01/13/mining-the 
-epa-vetoes-a-mountaintop-removal-mine—and-industry-opponents-fire-back/. 
174 Id. (quoting Kim Link, a spokeswoman for Arch Coal, the company that now owns 
the Spruce Mine). 
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Ginsburg’s contention that the EPA veto is not an effective 
safeguard.175 The question, however, is whether that challenge is 
enough to thwart evasive polluters. 
B. The Limitations of Mingo Logan II 
Notwithstanding the significance of Mingo Logan II, competing 
considerations limit the EPA veto as an effective safeguard against 
evasive polluters. These limitations include: the EPA’s own reluctance 
to invoke its veto authority, the uncertainty of the CWA’s citizen suit 
provision to compel the EPA to invoke its veto, coal’s economic 
influence at every level of government, changes in Administrations, 
and current legislative challenges to section 404(c) of the CWA. 
1. EPA’s Use of its Veto and the CWA’s Citizen Suit Provision 
Since the CWA’s enactment in 1972, the EPA has exercised its veto 
a total of thirteen times, including its first retroactive veto of the Spruce 
No. 1 Mine.176 Moreover, three of those thirteen vetoes occurred within 
the last twenty-five years.177 Assuming the Corps reviews 60,000 
permits per year, the Corps has evaluated 2.5 million permits since 
1972; this means the EPA has used its veto 0.0005% of the time in the 
past forty-two years.178 As a result, the EPA’s veto is extraordinarily 
rare. Current EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy confirmed this rarity, 
stating “[t]his is not something that the agency does very often.”179 
Naturally, the EPA’s reluctance to use its veto undercuts Justice 
Breyer’s reliance on section 404(c) and reduces the significance of 
Mingo Logan II. 
Given the rarity of the EPA veto, a citizen suit provision allowing 
individuals to compel the EPA to use its veto might strengthen Justice 
Breyer’s position. The CWA’s citizen suit provision provides that “any 
citizen may commence a civil action . . . against the [EPA] where there 
is alleged a failure of the [EPA] to perform any act or duty under [the 
 
175 Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 303 (2009) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
176 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 404(C) “VETO 
AUTHORITY” FACT SHEET, http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/upload/404c.pdf. 
177 See id. 
178 See id. (60,000 permits per year x 42 years = 2,520,000 permits; (13 vetoes/2,520,000 
permits) x 100 = 0.0005%). 
179 Kate Sheppard, Senators Seek to Curb EPA Authority on Mine Waste Disposal, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 15, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/15/epa-clean    
-water-act-mining_n_5153913.html. 
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CWA] which is not discretionary.”180 Whether the EPA’s veto 
authority is nondiscretionary is disputed among circuit courts. In 
Preserve Endangered Areas of Cobb’s History, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers, in which plaintiffs challenged a proposed highway 
construction project, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a lower court’s 
decision to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim under the CWA’s citizen suit 
provision.181 The court explained that the term, ‘authorize,’ found in 
section 404(c) suggests a discretionary function and “[b]ecause the 
[EPA’s veto] power is discretionary, the citizen suit provision of the 
Clean Water Act does not apply.”182 The D.C. Circuit agreed with the 
Eleventh Circuit in Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers, in which plaintiffs challenged the construction of a 
reservoir.183 In that case, the D.C. Circuit found that the “veto power . 
. . is discretionary” and the “EPA cannot be sued under the [citizen suit 
provision] for failing to veto the issuance of the permit.”184 
Conversely, in National Wildlife Federation v. Hanson, in which 
environmental groups complained about the EPA’s failure to invoke its 
veto authority, the Fourth Circuit found that section 404(c) is not 
discretionary, stating “[the citizen suit provision] should be interpreted 
. . . to allow citizens to sue the [EPA] [when] . . . the [EPA] fails to 
exercise the duty of oversight imposed by section [404(c)].”185 
Although dicta, lower courts have interpreted Hanson “to mean that the 
EPA’s section 404(c) oversight duty is nondiscretionary.”186 The 
 
180 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (2012). 
181 Pres. Endangered Areas of Cobb’s History, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 87 
F.3d 1242, 1249 (11th Cir. 1996). 
182 Id. 
183 Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 
(D.C. Cir. 2007). 
184 Id. at 4–5. Significantly, the D.C. Circuit found that the CWA citizen suit provision 
does not preclude suits under the APA. Id. at 9. The court explained that the APA does not 
“bar judicial review of EPA’s failure to veto [a] permit simply because that failure 
constitute[s] alleged inaction.” Id. The court then concluded that a reviewing court has 
subject matter jurisdiction over a claim alleging that the EPA wrongly failed to exercise 
discretion in their favor under section 706(2) of the APA, which permits courts to hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action found to be arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 9–10. 
185 Nat’l Wildlife Federation v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313, 316 (4th Cir. 1988). 
186 Christopher D. Eaton, Judicial Limitation of the EPA’s Oversight Authority in Clean 
Water Act Permitting of Mountaintop Mining Valley Fills, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 
225, 254 (2012). 
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Supreme Court has not decided whether the veto is nondiscretionary.187 
Without such clarity, citizens may or may not be able to compel the 
EPA to invoke its veto authority, producing another limit on the EPA’s 
use of its veto power. 
2. Coal’s Economic Influence on the Legislative, Executive, and 
Judiciary Branches 
The coal industry itself is an additional obstacle preventing the EPA 
from freely invoking its authority under section 404(c).188 In her 
dissent, Justice Ginsburg subtly raised such a concern, stating “[g]iven 
today’s decision, it is optimistic to expect that [the] EPA or the courts 
will act vigorously to prevent evasion of performance standards.”189 
Coal’s influence on the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches 
prevents such vigorous action. 
The coal industry contributes millions of dollars to state and federal 
political candidates. In Let’s Face Facts, These Mountains Won’t Grow 
Back: Reducing the Environmental Impact of Mountaintop Removal 
Coal Mining in Appalachia, Diana Kaneva detailed the contributions 
running from coal to state candidates.190 Citing a report from the 
Institute on Money in State Politics, Kaneva reported that coal mining 
contributed “at least $8.57 million to state-level political candidates 
and party committees” between 1999 and 2005.191 In West Virginia, 
the coal industry gave “$2 million to gubernatorial campaigns, $1.5 
million to state legislative races, and $529,332 to Supreme Court 
candidates” during 1996 to 2004.192 For example, Senator Manchin—
the West Virginia Senator who pledged to fight the EPA’s veto of the 
Spruce No. 1 Mine193—received $285,000 from the mining industry 
from 2000 to 2008 to run for Secretary of State and Governor of West 
 
187 The discretionary nature of the EPA veto arose during an exchange between Justice 
Scalia and Respondent SEACC’s counsel during oral argument in Coeur Alaska. In response 
to one of Justice Scalia’s questions concerning the veto, Respondent stated that “the veto 
authority is a discretionary authority” to which Justice Scalia responded, “right.” Oral 
Argument, supra note 67, at 47. This may or may not reflect Justice Scalia’s viewpoint on 
whether the veto is discretionary. In any event, this exchange is not binding on any court 
and was not pertinent to the issues before the Court in Coeur Alaska. 
188 Kaneva, supra note 19, at 954. 
189 Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 303 n.5 (2009) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
190 Kaneva, supra note 19, at 954. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 Broder, supra note 9. 
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Virginia.194 As a result, “running a political campaign against the coal 
industry in the Appalachian region is an election failure guarantee.”195 
Coal additionally extends its influence at the federal level. The 
Center for Responsive Politics reported that the coal industry 
contributed approximately $11 million during the 2014 election cycle 
with 96% of those contributions delivered to Republican candidates.196 
Arch Coal, the current owner of the Spruce No. 1 Mine, was the sixth 
highest contributor, giving 89.8% of its $415,575 donation to 
Republicans.197 Notably, West Virginia Senator Manchin is the only 
Democrat “among the top twenty recipients of campaign money from 
the mining industry,” receiving over $600,000.198 Moreover, Senator 
Mitch McConnell, the Senate Majority Leader, received the second 
highest amount of contributions from coal mining.199 Significantly, 
Senator McConnell’s top priority is to rein in the EPA.200 
The mining industry also contributes heavily to the executive 
branch, particularly donating millions of dollars to Republican 
presidential candidates. In the 2012 election, for example, presidential 
candidate Mitt Romney raised “more than $600,000 from mining 
 
194 Pete Quist, Names in the News: Gov. Joe Manchin, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MONEY 
IN STATE POLITICS, (Aug. 8, 2010), http://beta.followthemoney.org/research/institute             
-reports/names-in-the-news-gov-joe-manchin/. 
195 Mark Baller & Leor Joseph Pantilat, Defender’s of Appalachia: The Campaign To 
Eliminate Mountaintop Coal Mining and the Role of Public Justice, 73 ENVTL. L. 629, 656 
(2007) (quoting an interview with Joe Hecker, the Environmental Enforcement Director at 
Public Justice). 
196 Coal Mining: Long-Term Contribution Trends, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2014&ind=E1210 (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2015). 
197 Coal Mining: Top Contributors to Federal Candidates, Parties, and Outside Groups, 
CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/contrib.php 
?cycle=2014&ind=E1210 (last visited Nov. 14, 2015). 
198 Evan Osnos, Chemical Valley, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 7, 2014, http://www.new 
yorker.com/magazine/2014/04/07/chemical-valley. 
199 Coal Mining: Top Recipients, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, https://www 
.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.php?cycle=2014&ind=E1210 (last visited Nov. 14, 
2015). 
200 Morgan Winsor, Sen. Mitch McConnell ‘Going To War’ With Obama Over Coal, 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (Nov. 15, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.com/sen-mitch         
-mcconnell-going-war-obama-over-coal-1724366; see also Ari Phillips, Mitch McConnell 
Says His Top Priority Is To ‘Get The EPA Reined In, THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 7, 2014), 
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/11/07/3590277/mcconnell-priority-rein-epa/. 
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interests” by August 2012.201 In the 2008 election, President Barak 
Obama was not among the list of the top twenty recipients of 
contributions from coal while Senator John McCain raised $121,276 
from the industry.202 
West Virginia politics is illustrative of coal’s influence on 
presidential elections. Prior to electing President George W. Bush in 
2000, the state had not voted for a non-incumbent Republican 
presidential candidate since 1928.203 President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
established Democratic control of the state when he developed relief 
programs during the Great Depression, and President John F. Kennedy 
did the same when he promised to introduce aid to combat poverty in 
Appalachia.204 In 1999, Karl Rove, Bush’s campaign strategist, opened 
eighteen offices across West Virginia and sought donations from the 
coal industry, receiving triple the amount from the previous election.205 
Bush’s campaign convinced voters that the state’s coal industry was 
under attack by the Clinton Administration, citing President Clinton’s 
support of Bragg v. Robertson, in which a West Virginia district court 
issued an injunction blocking a mountaintop removal mining project.206 
West Virginians grew concerned that the ruling would eliminate jobs 
and, in the 2000 election, voted for President Bush.207 West Virginia 
has voted for a Republican nominee ever since.208 
Lastly, the judiciary is not wholly immune from the influence of coal 
mining interests. At the state level, industry “pours money into state 
Supreme Courts,”209 rendering it difficult for elected judges to remain 
completely free from partiality and sympathy.210 An extreme example 
 
201 Paul Blumenthal, Mitt Romney Energy Plan Favors Big Donors in Oil, Gas and Coal 
Industries, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08 
/24/mitt-romney-energy-plan_n_1826681.html. 
202 Aaron Kierch, Coal Mining: Background, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.php?cycle=2008&ind=E1210 (last updated 
June 2015). 
203 Osnos, supra note 198. 
204 Id. 
205 Id.; see also Kaneva, supra note 19, at 955 (noting that coal mining contributed close 
to $4 million to George W. Bush’s campaign). 
206 John Judis, King Coal, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Dec. 5, 2002), http://prospect 
.org/article/king-coal-0. 
207 Id. 
208 Betsy Woodruff, Goodbye West Virginia, SLATE (Oct. 29, 2014, 8:38 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/10/republicans_are_turning
_west_virginia _red_how_the_democrats_lost_control.html. 
209 Kaneva, supra note 19, at 955. 
210 Id. 
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of coal’s influence on the judiciary came before the Supreme Court in 
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal, Co.211 In this case, a West Virginia jury 
returned a verdict that found defendant Massey Coal liable for 
“fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, and tortious interference 
with existing contractual relations” and awarded plaintiff Caperton $50 
million in damages.212 After the verdict but before the defendant’s 
appeal, West Virginia held judicial elections, in which Donald 
Blankenship, the defendant’s President, Chief Executive Officer, and 
Chairman, donated $3 million to then attorney Brent Benjamin’s 
campaign for a position on the West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals—the court that would hear the appeal of the Caperton 
verdict.213 Benjamin won the election and, after denying plaintiff’s 
recusal motion, presided over the appeal and reversed the jury 
verdict.214 Justice Benjamin denied two subsequent motions requesting 
his recusal.215 The Supreme Court remanded the action, finding that the 
“extraordinary contributions were made at a time when Blankenship 
had a vested stake in the outcome,” and “due process require[d] 
recusal.”216 
Additionally, at the federal level, the increase of Republican 
politicians over the last twenty-five years has corresponded to an 
increase in judicial appointments in federal courts.217 Republican 
Administrations “have transformed the judiciary into a much more 
conservative branch.”218 For example, after the Fourth Circuit 
overturned two key district court opinions that held valley fills illegal, 
it gained the reputation “as friendly to the coal industry.”219 
 
211 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
212 Id. at 872. 
213 Id. at 873–74. 
214 Id. at 874. 
215 Id. at 875. 
216 Id. at 872. 
217 Baller & Pantilat, supra note 195, at 657. 
218 Id. 
219 Evans, supra note 14, at 532; see also Ann C. Hodges, Lessons from the Laboratory: 
The Polar Opposites on the Public Sector Labor Law Spectrum, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 735, 759 (2009) (“The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the 
federal circuit court covering Virginia, has a reputation as the most conservative appeals 
court in the country.”). 
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The industry’s ability to contribute funding to individuals at every 
level of government is “pervasive and disturbing.”220 More 
importantly, coal industry contributions can potentially influence 
environmental policies and judicial decisions at the state and federal 
level, simultaneously solidifying a favorable atmosphere for mining 
projects and an unfavorable atmosphere for the EPA veto. 
3. Changes in Administrations 
The political agenda of the Administration in charge may also 
impact the EPA’s veto authority and reduce its ability to prevent 
polluters seeking to evade CWA sections 301 and 306. The White 
House not only appoints agency heads but also exerts political pressure 
on certain agencies to align regulations with party interests.221 For 
example, the controversial 2002 fill definition demonstrates how three 
different Administrations influenced agencies with party political 
objectives. 
The development of the 2002 fill definition began in 1999 when 
Bragg threatened the practice of mountaintop removal mining.222 In 
Bragg, the district court found, among other things, that the Corps did 
not have authority to regulate fill material from mountaintop removal 
mining projects when discharged “for the primary purpose of waste 
disposal.”223 The Fourth Circuit ultimately reversed the injunction on 
sovereign immunity grounds, but upheld a settlement agreement 
between plaintiffs and the Federal defendants in which the Clinton 
Administration promised to closely examine mountaintop removal 
mining permits.224 From here, the Clinton Administration proposed a 
fill definition that “would allow mining debris to be deposited in 
streams, but only as part of a comprehensive approach that would 
 
220 Kaneva, supra note 19, at 956. 
221 For example, a New York Times article published an account from an EPA official 
that indicated the EPA was “told to take our clean water and clean air cases, put them in a 
box, and lock it shut.” Charles Duhigg, Clean Water Laws are Neglected, at a Cost in 
Suffering, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/us/13water 
.html. 
222 Bragg v. Robertson (Bragg I), 72 F. Supp. 2d 642 (S.D. W. Va. 1999), rev’d sub nom. 
Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass’n (Bragg II), 248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2001). 
223 Id at 657. 
224 Bragg II, 248 F.3d at 286; see also Settlement Agreement, Bragg v. Robertson, Civ. 
No. 2:98-0636 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 23, 1998) available at http://www.epa.gov/region03 
/r3pol/hsettle.pdf. 
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address long-term environmental concerns.”225 The proposal failed due 
to the upcoming election.226 
During his presidential campaign, President Bush attacked the 
Clinton Administration for its approval of Bragg and promised the coal 
industry to “expand” and not limit “energy supplies . . . in 
Appalachia.”227 Shortly after the election, environmentalists brought 
suit against the Corps in Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v. 
Rivenburgh to challenge the dumping of mining waste into streams.228 
At this time, President Bush revived the Clinton rule but changed “the 
kinds of materials that could be classified as ‘fill.’”229 Consequently, a 
few days before the district court rendered the Rivenburgh decision, the 
Bush Administration redefined “mining debris . . . to ‘fill’ rather than 
‘waste.’”230 Though the district court granted plaintiffs’ motion for 
summary judgment, contending that the “rewriting [of the fill 
definition] exceed[ed] the authority of administrative agencies,” the 
Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the district “reach beyond the 
issues” when it declared the fill definition unlawful.231 Accordingly, 
mountaintop removal mining “grew exponentially” under President 
Bush’s Administration.232 
When President Obama entered office, “more than one hundred 
surface mining permit applications were pending with the Corps.”233 
Although in a January 2010 interview EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson 
mentioned that the EPA was considering a revision of the fill rule and 
 
225 Joby Warrick, Appalachia Is Paying Price for White House Rule Change, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 17, 2004, at A01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6462           
-2004Aug 16.html. 
226 Id. 
227 Christopher Drew & Richard A. Oppel Jr., Mines to Mountaintops: Rewriting Coal 
Policy; Friends in the White House Come to Coal’s Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2004, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/09/us/mines-mountaintops-rewriting-coal-policy-friends 
-white-house-come-coal-s-aid.html. 
228 Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh (Rivenburgh I), 204 F. Supp. 
2d 927 (S.D. W. Va. 2002). 
229 Joby Warrick, supra note 225. 
230 Jessica Adams, Note, One Little Word Can Make All the Difference: Literal 
Interpretation Leads to Lake Destruction, 17 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 436, 441 (2010). 
231 Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh (Rivenburgh II), 317 F.3d 
425, 438 (4th Cir. 2003). 
232 Laura K. Bomyea, Dynamite, Disaster and Disappearing Options: How the EPA is 
Losing the Battle Against Destructive Mountaintop Removal Coal Mining Practices, 6 ALB. 
GOV’T L. REV. 224, 233 (2012). 
233 Id. at 241. 
BAHADUE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/13/2016  11:04 AM 
32 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 31, 1 
stated her staff was ‘working on it now,’”234 the Obama Administration 
did not approach the backlog of surface mining permit applications by 
changing the fill definition.235 Instead, the Obama Administration—the 
EPA, the Department of the Interior, and the Corps—initiated the 
following policies to curb mountaintop removal mining: a 2009 
Memorandum outlining Enhanced Coordination Procedures, a 2010 
Interim Detailed Guidance Memorandum, and a 2011 Final Detailed 
Guidance Memorandum to improve agency review of mining 
projects.236 As a result, the Administration has slowed issuance of 
section 404 permits to a “trickle.”237 
The above history of the 2002 fill definition serves to highlight the 
difficulties of adopting consistent environmental policy regarding 
mining operations and the CWA. In the same vein, the Coeur Alaska 
Court relied on an EPA memorandum to render its decision that section 
306 did not apply to section 404. Given an Administration’s influence 
on an agency’s policy and position, it stands to reason that the EPA 
could simply issue a new memorandum that promulgates a rule that 
states section 306 does apply to section 404.238 The ease with which 
agency policies can be changed renders the EPA’s veto vulnerable to 
the edicts of the Administration in charge. 
4. Current Legislative Challenges to the EPA’s Veto Authority 
An additional limitation of Mingo Logan II is current legislative 
action attempting to curb the EPA’s authority under section 404(c). 
After the EPA issued its Final Determination of the Spruce Mine, the 
111th and 112th Congresses introduced bills to delete section 404(c) 
and remove the EPA’s veto authority altogether.239 Other proposals 
aimed to reduce the EPA’s veto authority by imposing deadlines on the 
 
234 Paul Quinlan, EPA Loses Enthusiasm for Swift Rollback of Bush ‘Fill Rule,’ N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/02/25/25greenwire-epa-loses     
-enthusiasm-for-swift-rollback-of-bus-27352.html. 
235 Id. In February 2011, the EPA issued the following statement: “We don’t have plans 
to move forward at this time with guidance or rulemaking on the definition of fill material.” 
Id. 
236 Bomyea, supra note 232, at 242–45. 
237 Id. 
238 David R. Struwe, Casenote, Muddying the Waters of the Clean Water Act: Applying 
Chevron Deference to the CWA Pollutant Permit Regulatory Scheme in Coeur Alaska, Inc. 
v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 29 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 171, 199 
(2010). 
239 See COPELAND, supra note 13, at 16. 
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EPA, elevating the decision to higher agency officials, or precluding 
retroactive vetoes.240 
After Mingo Logan II, the 113th Congress introduced four bills 
targeting section 404(c).241 Two bills, H.R. 524 and S. 830, aimed to 
prohibit the EPA from issuing vetoes retroactively.242 The third bill, S. 
2156, sought to limit section 404(c) actions by precluding the EPA 
from issuing vetoes retroactively and invalidating vetoes previously 
issued retroactively, such as the Spruce No. 1 Mine.243 The fourth bill, 
H.R. 4854, would require the EPA to wait for the Corps to render a 
permit before exercising its veto authority.244 
In short, section 404(c) is politically vulnerable. If the above-
mentioned bills succeed, the EPA is completely removed from the 
section 404 permitting process, rendering Mingo Logan II wholly 
insignificant. While Justice Ginsburg deemed the EPA veto as “hardly 
reassuring,” the lack of an EPA check on the Corps’ permitting 
authority could produce the precise results raised in her dissent: 
polluters turning discharges subject to effluent limitations and 
standards of performance into fill material.245 
CONCLUSION 
The EPA sent a powerful message to the coal industry with the veto 
of the Spruce No. 1 Mine. Despite promising economic returns, the 
EPA focused on the harmful effects of mountaintop removal mining 
and took a giant leap toward achieving the CWA’s forty-two year old 
goals. 
Mingo Logan II additionally has the potential to thwart polluters 
attempting to manipulate the CWA permitting process. In Coeur 
Alaska, Justice Ginsburg exposed a potential “loophole” in the CWA 
permitting regime and raised concerns that “[w]hole categories of 
regulated industries” may “gain immunity” from pollution control 
standards by turning pollutants into fill material.246 In response, Justice 
 
240 See id. 
241 See id. at 16–17. 
242 H.R. 524, 113th Cong. (2014); S. 830, 113th Cong. (2014). 
243 S. 2156, 113th Cong. (2014). 
244 H.R. 4854, 113th Cong. (2014). 
245 Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 303 n.5 (2009) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
246 Id. at 302. 
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Breyer cited the EPA’s veto authority as an effective safeguard against 
such a result.247 Mingo Logan II supports Justice Breyer’s position and 
improves the landscape Coeur Alaska left behind. 
At the same time, Justice Ginsburg rightly expressed her skepticism 
in response to Justice Breyer’s reliance on the EPA’s veto.248 
Competing considerations limit the significance of Mingo Logan II. 
These include: the rarity in which the EPA invokes it veto, the 
uncertainty surrounding the CWA’s citizen suit provision, the coal 
industry’s economic influence at every stage of government, changes 
in Administrations, and current legislative challenges to the veto.249 In 
short, Justice Ginsburg is correct in saying that the EPA’s veto is 
“hardly reassuring” as an effective safeguard against evasive 
polluters.250 
Mingo Logan II is a powerful step in regulating mountaintop 
removal mining, but the decision may not be powerful enough. As 
Henry Caudill writes, coal “is an extractive industry, which takes all 
and restores nothing.”251 Despite the potential of Mingo Logan II to 
reduce this “extractive industry,” the foregoing competing 
considerations enable coal to continue to “take[] all” and “restore[] 
nothing.”252 
 
247 Id. at 293 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
248 Id. at 303 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
249 See supra Part IV.B. 
250 Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 303 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
251 CAUDILL, supra note 1. 
252 Id. 
